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The Role of Kinds in the Semantics of Ceteris
Paribus Laws∗
Bernhard Nickel · Harvard University
1 Introduction
CP-laws, or better, the cp-statements used to express them, are non-strict, and
hence inferentially inert: in the absence of substantial and unobvious back-
ground assumptions, cp-statements do not enter into deductively valid infer-
ences concerning their instances.1 Ravens are black implies nothing concerning
any individual raven. This inferential inertness animates a great deal of the
literature on cp-laws, since it makes it prima facie hard to see how the truth of
a cp-law is related to the truth of its instances, and how the epistemic status of
a cp-law is determined by the evidence available concerning these instances.2
CP-statements are inferentially inert when it comes to other cp-statements,
too: there are no general patterns of entailment connecting them. For this
reason, semantic theories for cp-statements have focused on truth-conditions for
cp-statements considered one by one, independently of their deductive relations,
and on non-deductive relations among cp-statements, such as probabilification
or the underwriting of a default-inference.3
In this paper, I take a fresh look at the logic of cp-statements. While there
are no fully general entailment patterns involving cp-statements, I will argue
that such patterns exist for an interesting subclass of these statements, those
that concern kinds.4 This in turn implies that semantic theories need to treat
the two sorts of cp-statements, those concerning kinds and those concerning
∗I want to thank the participants of the Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of
cp-clauses, where this paper was first presented, as well as the editors of this journal and two
anonymous referees.
1I qualify the claim in the main text by mentioning “substantial and unobvious background
assumptions.” Several semantic theories for cp-statements interpret them as restricted univer-
sal generalizations (e.g. Hausman, 1992). By adding the premise that an instance falls within
the restriction, we can draw a valid conclusion. However, such a restriction is substantial and
unobvious.
2See, e.g., Earman and Roberts (1999); Earman et al. (2002); Lange (2002); Pietroski and
Rey (1995).
3See, e.g., Spohn (2012).
4A terminological note: when I speak of kinds, I do not just have in mind Lewisian perfectly
natural properties (cf. Lewis, 1999). As will become clear in the sequel, the distinction between
kinds and non-kinds reflected in cp-statements involves a much for liberal understanding of
kinds.
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non-kinds, separately, which marks a major departure from almost all extant
accounts. This result also has an interesting implication for theories of kinds
in the special sciences: we cannot explicate the difference between kinds and
non-kinds in terms of cp-laws and cp-statements, perhaps by suggesting that a
property is a kind if and only if it appears in a cp-law, since our account of the
latter must take an account of the former as antecedently understood. I shall
illustrate this upshot for the homeostatic property cluster (hpc) conception of
kinds.
1.1 Generics as CP-Statements
So far, I have identified cp-statements functionally, as statements that express
cp-laws. As realizers of this role, I focus on generics rather than (semi-)formal
sentences containing the expression ceteris paribus or its cognates. Generics
are a type of natural language sentence; the generics I focus on are bare plural
generalizations, sentences whose subjects are plural noun phrases without any
determiners, such as ravens in ravens are black, lions in lions have four legs, or
blue-eyed cats in blue-eyed cats are usually blind.
Focusing on generics has at least three benefits. First, generics are used
quite generally to state cp-laws and hence map directly onto scientific practice.
1. For animals, m = w
3
4 , where m is the animal’s metabolic rate, w its weight.
(Kleiber’s Law of ecology)5
2. Children are 2-knowers before they are 3-knowers. (Developmental psy-
chology)6
3. Kestrels lay five eggs per clutch.7
4. During the day, the sea breeze flows from sea to land.8
By contrast, the use of the expression ceteris paribus is common only in eco-
nomics, and even there is short of universal.9
Second, by focusing on generics, I can draw on the usual tools to distinguish
semantic from pragmatic features to help discern inferential patterns.
Finally, focusing on generics naturally imposes divisions within the field of
cp-statements, cleaving it into theoretically more manageable chunks. Some
generics concern groupings of individuals and samples and ascribe character-
istic properties to them. These form one theoretically unified class. Others
ascribe dispositions or capacities, which form a distinct theoretical class. In
the former class belong the examples I have already mentioned, in the latter
5Cf. West et al. (1997a).
6Cf. Carey (2009).
7Cf. Stearns and Hoekstra (2000).
8Cf. Smith and Pun (2010).
9See Schiffer (1991, 10) and Woodward (2002, 305).
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generics such as this iron bar expands when heated.10 These can be told apart
using straightforwardly semantic means.11
Imposing such divisions is a job that any theory of cp-statements must do,
since it is widely agreed that the cp-statements as a whole do not form a unified
domain. Generics allow us to do so in a way that’s largely theory-neutral, and to
have fairly clear divisions. To appreciate this, consider an alternative suggestion
from Spohn (2002).
“Ceteris paribus” = “other things being equal” is obviously a rela-
tional condition. [. . . ] Another frequent qualification is that a law
holds only in the absence of disturbing influences. Still another way
of hedging is to say that a law holds only under normal conditions.
A fourth kind are ideal conditions that are assumed by idealized laws
though they are known not to obtain strictly.12
These distinctions can be hard to apply. Ravens are black is perhaps of the
third kind, lions have four legs is perhaps of the second. This iron bar expands
when heated might belong to either the second or fourth. I am unsure where
blue-eyed cats are usually blind would fall.
Note also that the categories are described in terms of the theory they are
used to articulate. This is not an objection by itself, since the stipulations are
part of the overall theory, and we should judge the theory as a whole. It does
mean that by focusing on generics, we have one more point at which to ground
the theory in data.
2 The Logic of CP-Statements
Consider the examples (5).
5. (a) Ravens fly.
(b) Birds fly.
Both sentences are true. I will argue that this combination of truth-values is
not an accident, but represents an entailment of generics concerning kinds, and
as such instantiates a general pattern. My argument proceeds in three steps.
First (§2.1), I argue that the pattern really is present in full generality, and
that this pattern can be captured by invoking the distinction between kinds
and non-kinds. Second (§2.2), I argue that extant accounts which do not invoke
the kind/non-kind distinction are empirically inadequate. Hence, the pattern I
10Hu¨ttemann (this volume) offers a theory of cp-laws in terms of dispositions. The argument
I have just made here can be seen as lending further methodological support for treating
ascriptions of dispositions as a theoretically viable subgroup of cp-laws. The two kinds of
cp-laws do not exhaust the class of generalizations usually captured under the heading of
cp-laws. Idealizations are a third (cf. Reutlinger, this volume, for further discussion).
11See, e.g., Nickel (in prep).
12Spohn (2002, 354). Cf. also Schurz (2002).
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describe should be captured by invoking the distinction between kinds and non-
kinds. Finally (§2.3), I sketch a theoretically well-motivated semantic theory—
one I have defended in detail elsewhere—couched in terms of that distinction
which accounts for the entailment.
2.1 Kinds and Percolation
It is widely and correctly observed that generics do not in general allow an
inference from subset to superset, as illustrated in (6).13
6. (a) Albino ravens are white.
6⇒ b. Ravens are white.
However, there is a more restricted range of generics where the inference from
subset to superset is valid. Specifically,
Kind Percolation Where the As and Bs are kinds, and the As are a subkind
of the Bs, the following inference is valid.
As are F
∴ Bs are F.
Informally: characteristic properties of kinds percolate up the taxonomic hier-
archy.14 (5) is an instance of kind percolation.
To be clear, I take it as uncontroversial that the examples in (5) are true.
The crucial claim is that this combination of truth-values reflects an entailment.
One might think this claim obviously false. Consider (7) and (8).
7. Lions give birth to live young.
8. Platypus lay eggs.
kind percolation implies that (7) and (8) entail (9) and (10), respectively.
9. Mammals give birth to live young.
10. Mammals lay eggs.
And while (9) is certainly unobjectionable, (10) seems clearly false, and hence
a counterexample to kind percolation. This constellation of examples isn’t
hard to replicate, either.
11. (a) Ravens fly.
⇒ Birds fly.
13For completeness: the inference from superset to subset does not go through either.
14I do not intend kind percolation to entail that there is a single taxonomic hierarchy.kind
percolation only holds if the kinds involved do stand in the relevant relationship.
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(b) Emus run.
⇒ (?) Birds run.
12. (a) Lions have manes.
⇒ (?) Big cats have manes.
(b) Tigers have stripes.
⇒ (?) Big cats have stripes.
I will argue that the unquestioned oddity of these sentences is due not to their
being false, for they are true, but to a pragmatic effect: they give rise to a false
implicature.
Why think that that they are true? Consider polymorphisms in biology.
These are cases in which a population can be divided into disjoint subpopula-
tions. Take the African butterfly Papilio dardanus as an example. The males of
the species have a single characteristic color which makes them inconspicuous in
their natural habitat. The females exhibit multiple patterns, with one pattern
resembling the males, while the other patterns are quite conspicuous. These
are instances of Batesian mimicry: each closely resembles that of a group of
butterflies that resist predation by being unpleasant to eat. Thus, there is an
adaptive advantage in being conspicuous for the Papilio. Further, there is an
adaptive advantage in maintaining multiple coloration patterns, because if all of
the conspicuous Papilio were to mimic the same danaid, the connection between
coloration and bad taste would be weakened in the predator birds, making this
an instance of frequency dependent selection.
There is every reason to treat each of the adaptive colors of females as
characteristic colors, i.e., to treat all of the sentences in (13) as true.
13. (a) Papilio are brown.
(b) Papilio are yellow.
(c) Papilio are orange.
Nonetheless, it is odd to say just one of (13a)–(13c) on their own. Doing so gives
rise to the impression that the asserted cp-statement is the whole truth about
the color of Papilio, and it is that impression, rather than the cp-statement’s
actual semantic content, that is clearly false. This diagnosis is supported by
performing a standard test for implicatures. We can assert the target sentence
while explicitly denying the implicature I claim to be present, as in (14).
14. Papilio are brown, though I don’t mean to imply that it’s their only char-
acteristic color.
This removes the implicature, and once the implicature is removed, the sen-
tence is unobjectionable, showing that the oddity of the original is due to that
implicature.
With this in mind, return to (10), mammals lay eggs. Its infelicity in most
contexts stems from the fact that asserting it conveys that egg-laying is the
whole truth about reproduction in mammals as an implicature. Just as in the
case of Papilio, the infelicity is removed when that implicature is cancelled.
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15. Mammals lay eggs, though I don’t mean to suggest that this is their only
or even most common mode of reproduction.
At this point, one may accept that mammals lay eggs is true, but maintain
that I have changed the topic. I explain. Not all sentences with bare plural
subjects predicate characteristic properties of the kind mentioned. Some are
simply existential, such as (16).
16. Ravens are sitting on my lawn.
The arguments I have made so far have brought out that sentences like mammals
lays eggs have an existential flavor to them—one could reasonably paraphrase
it as egg-laying is one of the characteristic modes of reproduction for mammals.
One may take this existential flavor as an indication of a semantic difference
between standard cp-statements and the sentences I have been concerned with.
The former are near universal, while the latter are existential. Hence, kind
percolation may still fail for genuine cp-statements.
I agree that mammals lays eggs has an existential flavor, but I deny that this
makes them semantically distinct from paradigmatic cp-statements like ravens
are black or any of the examples I quoted at the beginning, (1)–(4). There is no
semantic criterion by which these examples can be told apart from the examples
I have been discussing most recently.15 Here, my reliance on generics as data
leads to significant theoretical conclusions, since a theorist who starts out with
a regimented and stipulated notion of ceteris paribus, might take it as a given
that cp-statements must have a near-universal character.16
Consider now a different but related concern. kind percolation seems to
imply that higher taxa have very odd, and possibly metaphysically impossible,
combinations of properties. Thus (9) and (10) seem to imply that mammals
give birth to live young and lay eggs, even though it’s impossible for any one
mammal to do both. However, this problem is not particular to entailments
licensed by kind percolation, as (17) shows.
17. (a) Lions have manes.
(b) Lions give birth to live young.
(c) Lions have manes and give birth to live young.
The first two sentences are uncontroversially true, and they seem to imply the
third sentence, without giving rise to a commitment that any individual lion
has both a mane and gives birth to live young. So kind percolation does not
saddle us with impossible commitments, either.17
Let me now turn to another sort of potential counterexample, (18).
18. (a) Penguins don’t fly.
15I defend this claim in detail in other work. See Nickel (2008, 2010).
16One particularly clear example of this approach is Schurz (this volume).
17It’s a further question how to account for this in a systematic semantic theory. See Leslie
(2007); Liebesman (2011) for discussion.
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(b) Birds don’t fly.
Once again, the first member of the pair is fine, the second objectionable. And
in this case, the problem is not that (18b) has a false implicature; note the utter
unacceptability of (19).
19. # Birds don’t fly, though I don’t mean to imply that no sort of bird
characteristically flies.
Clearly, (18b) semantically excludes flying from the characteristic modes of lo-
comotion for birds, making it false outright.
At the same time, this observation explains why (18) is not a counterexample
to kind percolation. (18a) doesn’t attribute a characteristic property to the
kind penguin. Rather, it says that flight is not among these characteristics.
More formally, (18a) has wide-scope (sentential) negation: it is not the case that
flight is a characteristic property of penguins. And within the scope of negation,
ordinary inferential relations are reversed, so that kind percolation does not
falsely predict (18a) to entail (18b).18
A final objection to kind percolation is conceptual. One might object that
all truth-evaluable generics concern kinds. This objection can have linguistic
or metaphysical grounds. In the linguistics literature, this contention is usually
supported by pointing to the contrast between (20a) and (20b).19
20. (a) Coke bottles have short necks.
(b) # Green bottles have short necks.
However, I think that the intuitive contrast between (20a) and (20b) is mis-
diagnosed. There are many true generics that concern collections we cannot
reasonably consider kinds in their own right.
21. (a) Cats with blue eyes are usually blind.
(b) Whoopee cushions left on the chairs of unsuspecting professors in
large seminars are most effective.
Something other than the fact that the green bottles do not form a kind must
be responsible for the oddity of (20b).20
One may also argue against the existence of true, non-kind-concerning gener-
ics on more metaphysical grounds. Consider (22).
22. (a) Albino ravens are white.
(b) Female tigers give birth to live young.
18I develop a semantics that predicts these results in a formally more precise way and
motivates them in Nickel (2010).
19Cf. Krifka et al. (1995, 11).
20Space constraints prevent me from pursuing this point here. For further discussion, see
Nickel (in prep, chp. 6).
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(c) Immature crimson rosellas are green.
The properties of the collections mentioned in these examples can be investi-
gated inductively, and the members of these collections are causally more or less
homogeneous with respect to the properties mentioned. One may conclude that
they form kinds just as much as the ravens, tigers, and crimson rosellas.
Against this objection, I want to point out that in the practice of the sciences
at issue, in this case, biology, a sharp distinction is usually drawn between a
species and partial collections of members of a species, with only the former
being taken as forming a theoretically significant unity. Similar remarks apply
to non-biological examples. Children form a psychological kind in the context
of developmental psychology, but children who grow up in severely stimulus-
deprived environments do not.
Of course, this response may strike some as unsatisfactory, since it does
not take the form of a theory of natural kinds, showing what more there is to
forming a kind beyond being causally homogeneous and inductively investigable.
Dialectically, such a demand is misplaced. We’re investigating how a distinction
between kinds and non-kinds might manifest itself in various aspects of scientific
practice. To claim that the examples I’ve presented as concerning non-kinds in
fact concern kinds is to beg the central question.
These considerations make the case that there is a pattern in truth-values
among generic sentences that extensionally coincides with the pattern predicted
by kind percolation. In other words, there is a pattern that can be captured
by invoking the kind/non-kind distinction. I now turn to two considerations to
show that the pattern should be so captured.
2.2 Extant Alternatives
Most extant semantic theories of cp-statements do not recognize a distinction
between cp-statements that concern kinds and cp-statements that concern non-
kinds. That includes theories of cp-statements that are otherwise as different
from each other as Fodor (1991); Lange (2002); Mitchell (1997, 2000); Piet-
roski and Rey (1995); Schurz (2001, 2002, 2011); Spohn (2002); Strevens (2012);
Woodward (2003).21 Indeed, the only exception to this near consensus is Lowe
(2009). In this subsection, I look at whether these extant accounts offer us the
resources to handle the data without invoking the kind/non-kind distinction.
The issue turns on a widely shared commitment, the viability of what I will
call the majority constraint: it holds that a cp-statement is acceptable only if
most members of the kind conform to it.22
21This is not to say that these theories hold that any predicate can figure in a cp-statement.
As with all laws, the predicates in cp-statements cannot be too gruesome without rendering
the statement defective. However, among the viable cp-statements, these theories do not
distinguish those that concern kinds and those that do not.
22See, for example, Mitchell (1997, 2000); Schurz (2001, 2011); Woodward (2001, 2003) and
proponents of the hpc conception (such as Boyd, 1992, 1999; Kornblith, 1993; Wilson et al.,
2007). It is also endorsed by Lange (1995, 2000, 2002); Spohn (2002, 2012). An interesting
case in this respect is Schrenk (this volume); he does not explicitly discuss how important
8
A proponent of this constraint agrees with me on some of the data but
accounts for them differently while disagreeing with me over others. On this
approach, (5a) and (5b)—ravens fly and birds fly—both happen to be true,
though not deductively related. Birds run, mammals lay eggs, big cats have
manes, and big cats have stripes are all false. The proponent of the majority
constraint may well treat this as a point in her favor.
The greatest challenge to the constraint derives from cp-statements that
reflect the existence of polymorphisms, since a flat-footed application of the
constraint implies that some of these cp-statements must be false. I have argued
that these cp-statements are true (though asserting them on their own may be
odd in some contexts), and I take this to be a non-negotiable fact about the
data. I have also argued that the truth of these statements provides support
for my interpretation of the data a proponent of the majority-constraint and I
disagree over.
The crucial question for our purposes, then, is whether a proponent of the
majority-constraint can account for the data concerning polymorphisms consis-
tently with her treatment of the other data. This question has been discussed
in different contexts, and proponents of the majority-constraint have offered
three responses: conditional, capacity, and discipline-centered. I’ll briefly dis-
cuss each, arguing that they all fail. This in turn suggests that alternative
treatments of the data fail. kind percolation should be accepted.
On the conditional strategy, one re-analyses the polymorphic variants in
terms of conditional properties. Consider sexual dimorphism as an example, and
specifically, the fact that male dogs have testes.23 On the conditional strategy,
this does not imply that it’s characteristic for dogs to have testes. Rather,
dogs characteristically have testes if male. This property is common to males
and females alike, and hence no longer violates the majority constraint. The
conditional strategy thus analyzes polymorphisms away, since the population is
almost completely uniform with respect to the posited conditional properties.
Our ordinary ascriptions of characteristic properties are then simply shorthand,
mentioning only the consequent of the conditional property.
Unfortunately, the conditional strategy is also far too permissive.24 All or-
ganisms share the conditional property that if they are cognitively as developed
as humans, they have complex social and cultural institutions. This is true of
mealworms, for example, and yet there is no sense in which it is characteristic
of mealworms that if they are as cognitively developed etc. We would certainly
never describe mealworms as having complex social and cultural institutions by
way of short-handing the conditional characteristic property, throwing doubt on
the characteristicness of that conditional property.25
broad statistical coverage is to assessing any given system of laws, so the view can perhaps be
developed to be compatible with the rejection of the majority constraints.
23This example is taken from Wilson et al. (2007, 211).
24See also Ereshefsky and Matthen (2005); Matthen (2009) for further discussion.
25It is of course metaphysically impossible for mealworms to instantiate the antecedent of
this conditional. But the proponent of the conditional strategy cannot appeal to this fact in
order to block the conclusion that it’s characteristic for them that if they are as cognitively
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What is more, the conditional strategy threatens to remove an intuitive
distinction between polymorphisms and traits that are properly handled using
conditional structures. The latter include what are sometimes called “induced
responses:” a single genotype can produce different phenotypes depending on
environmental conditions, such as producing defensive structures in the pres-
ence, and only in the presence, of predators during development, a pattern
exhibited by waterfleas of the genus Daphnia.26 It would be better to be able
to maintain the distinction between these sorts of traits and polymorphisms.27
So the conditional strategy for saving a majority constraint fails.
The capacity response has been offered primarily as a means of defending
the majority constraint against examples in which, at least at first glance, the
majority of members of a kind are aberrations. The most famous example here
is (23).
23. Sea-turtles are long-lived.
Most sea-turtles die within hours of hatching, yet (23) is clearly true. Schurz
(2001) has suggested that in this case, the property predicated of sea-turtles is
not actually that of achieving a long life-span, but of having the capacity to
do so. This capacity is shared by most sea-turtles, removing the threat to the
majority constraint.
While remaining neutral on this treatment of (23), it seems clear that it
cannot be extended to polymorphisms. In no natural sense of capacity do fe-
males of a species have the capacity to be male, for example. So the ascription
dogs have testes cannot be compatible with the majority constraint in virtue
of females having the capacity to have testes. Note the contrast to the condi-
tional strategy: there, females posed no problem because they could satisfy the
antecedent of “if male, then testes” vacuously, as it were. But the possibility
of vacuous satisfaction made the conditional strategy too permissive. The ca-
pacity strategy doesn’t allow such vacuous satisfaction, avoiding the mealworm
problem, but it is too demanding. So this strategy fails, as well
Finally, some semantics of cp-statements make the interpretation of these
statements sensitive to the disciplinary context in which they are articulated
(particularly Lange, 2000, 2002; Woodward, 2003). On this view, cp-statements
are true only if they hold in most (perhaps even all) cases of interest to the
discipline. To take Lange’s example: island biogeography, which articulates the
area law, simply ignores the possibility of massive solar radiation killing off all
species. But it seems clear that polymorphisms fall squarely within the bound-
aries of the disciplines that study them. So the discipline-relativity advocated
by these theorists cannot be invoked to save the majority constraint on cp-laws,
either.
developed etc. It is also metaphysically impossible for a female to be male, yet that does not
stand in the way of her having the conditional property “if male, then having testes.”
26Cf. Dodson (1989).
27Schurz (2001) draws a similar contrast in a different context between polyphenic traits
and genuine polymorphisms.
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As the majority constraint falls, so does our best hope of accounting for
the distribution of truth-values among cp-statements that does not invoke a
kind/non-kind distinction. I therefore conclude that the distribution of truth-
values should be captured by invoking that distinction.
2.3 An Outline of a Sketch of a Positive Account
To complete the defense of kind percolation, I sketch a theory that takes
the kind/non-kind distinction into account. This simplified account does not
generalize easily to logically complex sentences, concerning negation or more
complex predicates containing logical operators. To do so, it needs to be sup-
plemented with a detailed description of the LF of generics (the syntactic struc-
ture of generics relevant to the compositional semantic interpretation of these
sentences), which itself needs to be defended and explained.28 More complex
generics also require further principles concerning the mechanisms that can un-
derwrite the truth of a generic. I present and defend a full semantics that
addresses these issues in other work.29 For the purposes of this discussion, I
will confine myself to the simplest generics. At the end of this section, I’ll
describe the interpretation the semantics yields for a more complex sentence
(Kleiber’s Law, mentioned earlier) without working through how the semantics
predicts this compositionally.
I also want to emphasize that the semantics I sketch here will not address
all of the questions a complete theory of cp-statements needs to answer—more
on this below. The point of this sketch is only to indicate how the distinction
between kinds and non-kinds can be incorporated into a semantic theory.
Several theorists have suggested that cp-laws are closely connected to the
existence of mechanisms, where we should think of mechanisms as constellations
of events, states, and background conditions.30 I propose to forge the connection
thus.
CP-Statements concerning Kinds
As are F is true iff
there is a suitable mechanism m that operates in at least some As and
that leads to an A being F unless the mechanism is distorted or its output
altered after the fact.
In this statement of the truth-conditions of cp-statements concerning kinds, I’m
treating the cp-statement as not logically articulated, and hence not composi-
tionally, in line with the simplifying assumptions I flagged at the outset. In the
28LF is meant to be evoke the notion of a logical form, though it’s a technical notion.
29See Nickel (in prep).
30See for example the proponents of the hpc conception of kinds mentioned in note 22, along
with the new mechanists (e.g. Craver, 2007, 2009; Machamer et al., 2000) and Strevens (2012).
In this volume, the contrast between theories of cp-laws that are connected to mechanisms
and theories that are not is represented by Pemberton and Cartwright (this volume); Strevens
(this volume) on the mechanism side, and Roberts (this volume) on the non-mechanistic side.
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fully developed semantics, I posit a covert generic operator in the LF of these
sentences that operates roughly like a quantificational determiner.
The substance of the semantics is really the existence of a suitable mecha-
nism: the truth of a cp-statement only depends on its existence. There is no
significant statistical constraint. Spelling out this account then requires a theory
of suitability, which almost certainly needs to appeal to the explanatory needs,
interests, and disciplinary parameters of the researchers articulating the relevant
cp-statements. Crucially, such a theory of suitability needs to give substantive,
non-generic criteria for what it takes for a mechanism to be distorted or altered
after the fact. It is up to this theory of suitability to tell us in what sense the
developmental mechanism associated operative in albino ravens is “distorted” so
as to ensure that the existence of that mechanism does not underwrite the truth
of ravens are white. 31 It is here that my sketched theory will remain a sketch.
For my purposes, I’ll take the notion of suitability as primitively understood.
Even given this preliminary sketch, we can already see that these semantics
validate kind percolation. Suppose that As are F is true and that the As
form a kind. Then there’s a suitable mechanism that operates in at least some
As, etc. Now suppose that the Bs also form a kind, and that the As are a subkind
of the Bs. By the last assumption, every A is also a B, and hence the suitable
mechanism etc. operates in at least some Bs. Hence, the truth-conditions of Bs
are F are satisfied.
Turn now to the semantics for cp-statements concerning non-kinds.32 If we
simply extended the semantics I just pointed to, we would predict that a prin-
ciple corresponding to kind percolation held for non-kinds. Assume that
albino ravens are white is true. Then the coloration mechanism that operates
in albinos must be suitable, and since all albino ravens are ravens, this suit-
able coloration mechanism that leads to white ravens operates in at least some
ravens. Hence ravens are white is predicted to be true. This argument obvi-
ously generalizes. The semantics for cp-statements concerning non-kinds need
to break this argument. Here’s how I propose to do so.
CP-statements concerning non-kinds are also interpreted in terms of mech-
anisms, but not in terms of suitable mechanisms. Instead of identifying the
mechanism that underwrites the truth of a non-kind cp-statement in terms of
the notion of suitability that appears in the semantics for cp-statements con-
cerning kinds, it’s identified derivatively. Let me give an example.
We need to account for the fact that the coloration mechanism that leads to
white albino ravens can underwrite the truth of albino ravens are white. We look
for a mechanism that is associated with the corresponding kind, the ravens and
a characteristic property along the same dimension, in this case, color.33 This
31See, for example, Strevens (2012) and Nickel (in prep).
32The notion of a kind-derived subgroup is a metaphysical, not a syntactic one. There are
kinds that have syntactically complex names, such as Common Raven or Duckbilled platypus,
and ice probably doesn’t form a natural kind on its own, though it is syntactically simple.
33Such dimensions are more generally determinables of the property at issue. Having two
wings lies along the dimension of having some number of wings. Flying lies along the dimension
of means of locomotion.
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mechanism is the developmental mechanism issuing in black ravens. We take
this mechanism and minimally alter it so that it can operate in members of the
kind-derived subgroup, the albinos, which is to say, it now includes the genetic
basis for albinism. We then allow the mechanism to proceed as much like the
source mechanism as possible, compatibly with its operating in members of the
subkind. This is the normal coloration mechanism for albino ravens.
Generalizing yields the following proposal.
CP-Statements concerning Non-Kinds
Consider the cp-statement about a kind-derived subgroup, G As are H,
where the group of the G As is derived from the kind constituted by the
As.
There is a mechanism that underwrites the truth of G As are H iff
there is a mechanism m such that
• there is a mechanism m* that underwrites the truth of a cp-law As
are H*, where H and H* lie along the same dimension, and
• m is just like m*, compatible with its operating in G As,34 and
• m is not interrupted or reversed.
We can immediately see that a principle corresponding to kind percolation
fails. Crucially, the way we identify a mechanism that can underwrite the truth
of a non-kind cp-statement does not imply that such a mechanism is suitable
in the sense of the semantics for cp-statements concerning kinds. Purely as a
heuristic, assume that a mechanism is suitable iff its presence is the result of
an adaptation.35. Thus, the coloration mechanism leading to black ravens is
suitable. But the way we identified the coloration mechanism leading to white
albinos, and in virtue of whose existence albino ravens are white is true, does
not imply that this mechanism is itself the result of an adaptation.
Let me end this section by describing the output the fully developed seman-
tics would yield for Kleiber’s Law, repeated here.
(1) For animals, m = w
3
4 , where m is the animal’s metabolic rate, w its weight.
I’ll disregard the parenthetical specification of what m and w stand for. I’ll
assume that for the purposes of ecology, the animals form a natural kind.36
(1) is true iff: there’s a mechanism that operates in at least some animals that
34A useful heuristic for evaluating what it takes for m* to be just like m is this. Begin with
m, considered as a sequence of causally connected events, states, and background conditions.
Do nothing until you need to alter any of the events, states, or background conditions to
allow that mechanism to operate in the kind-derived subgroup. Then allow the mechanism to
develop further.
35This is just an illustrative example. Suitability can take many different forms, even in
biological contexts, and certainly beyond
36Nota bene: I take it that ecology can have its own, proprietary complement of kinds,
including the hunters and the prey, the migratory animals, and so on. So while it may be false
that the animals as a whole form a natural kind within the context of evolutionary biology—
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issues in animals with the Kleiber-ratio, and that mechanism is suitable, given
the constraints on suitability imposed by ecology. The sorts of explanations that
are currently serious candidates (see, e.g., West et al., 1997b) certainly satisfy
this condition.
3 hpc and the Priority of Kinds
I have so far argued that a semantic theory for cp-statements needs to have
a bifurcated structure: it needs to treat cp-statements concerning kinds and
cp-statements concerning non-kinds separately. I finish this discussion by in-
dicating an upshot for a current theory of kinds in the special sciences, the
homeostatic property cluster (hpc) conception: according to this conception,
kinds are defined in terms of cp-laws. Roughly, a collection of objects forms
a kind iff they share a suitable mix of properties that are truly predicated of
that collection in a cp-law. For example, the ravens form a kind because the
ravens share some suitable mix of properties that are truly predicated of them
in cp-laws of the form ravens are F.
The idea underlying this account of kinds goes back at least to John Stuart
Mill. A collection forms a kind because the properties of the members of that
collection can be investigated inductively.37 The hpc account develops this
basic idea in two ways. It offers an account of what it means to say that we
investigate the properties of members of a kind by induction when we are dealing
with collections that aren’t completely homogeneous, and it offers a theory of
what a suitable mix of properties is, given that not all members of the kind will
share all of the properties truly predicated of the kind in a cp-law.38
The discussion so far raises a fundamental objection to the architecture of
the hpc account. It tries to define the notion of a natural kind by appeal to
cp-laws; but in order to give a satisfying account of those, it needs to take for
granted the very notion of a natural kind. If this argument can be sustained,
the circularity I identify spells doom for the prospects of the hpc conception of
kinds to fulfill its aspirations.
they aren’t a species, and it may be that only species are kinds (or kind-like individuals) in
evolutionary biology—they may still form a kind for the purposes of ecology. If the animals
don’t form a kind, the treatment I provide in the text applies equally to particular species,
and by kind-percolation, the property that characterizes species also applies to animals.
37Mill (1891/2002, 95). Cf. Goodman (1983); Quine (1969).
38See Wilson et al. (2007) for an excellent exposition.
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